Success and Failure in eGovernment Projects

Success/Failure Case Study No.20

A Land Licensing and Planning System for Beira City, Mozambique

Case Study Author

David Jackson davidjackson@wiseowls.org)

Application

Beira Executive Council (the local government authority for the city of Beira in Mozambique) initiated development of a decision support system, with a simple geographic information system interface. The data for the main database was based upon the register of city land plots, their zoning (open space, industrial, residential), and their status (vacant, under development, built on). The application produced information in two forms: a database report with information on plot status, and a digitised map of city plots which spatially represented the database. A common database package was used to hold the database, which was run on two stand-alone PCs linked to a digitisation tablet and two printers. A computer mapping/GIS product 'Data on the Map' was also used.

Application Description

Land is owned by the state and is divided into plots according to a pre-determined structure plan for the city. Licences for the development of vacant land are granted for a token fee on a first-come, first-served basis. Initially, licences are for two years, after which they are revoked if no significant development has taken place. In most cases, such decisions should be purely administrative.

Operationally the computerised application was intended to speed up decision-making by automating the processing of the majority of licence requests and revocations, leaving the Planning Department to concentrate on the few that warrant detailed consideration and negotiation. The application triggered warning letters and licence withdrawal notices where legislation and regulations were not being applied. For strategic land use planning, the application provided planners with land use information and trends, enabling them to better predict the future and match developers with suitable plots.

Application Purpose

Previously, the Land Registry consisted of an incomplete and inconsistent paper-based collection of dusty volumes detailing plot usage dating back over a century. No definitive map existed and some showed groups of plots with duplicate or non-contiguous numbering systems and plots overlaying others shown on different maps. Linking plots on the maps with the information in the Registry was sometimes difficult, providing insufficient information for both routine licences and long-term strategic planning. Digitising the maps and computerising the Registry was a way of updating the system, speeding it up and providing better quality information.

Stakeholders

Two temporary stakeholders were the project team, responsible for the design and installation of the application, and the external consultants, responsible for software development. Three permanent stakeholders are the political leadership of the local authority, staff in the Planning Department, and staff in its subordinate unit, the Land Registry. A further group of permanent stakeholders are the public and businesses who request licences to develop land.

Impact: Costs and Benefits

Costs and benefits can be divided between the installation and the operation of the application. Though installation took over a year, its financial costs were relatively cheap. Hardware, software and consulting costs together probably did not exceed US$60,000. Installation required lots of staff time and absorbed the whole department for long periods. This included training the whole department in IT skills and physically visiting each of the many thousand plots to verify their current status. Staff worked long hours painstakingly entering this information into the database and constructing the digital maps. However, the opportunity cost of this time was not that high because prior to installation productivity was low and overstaffing rife. The process was like a breath of fresh air and a key benefit was the introduction of IT to the department and the job satisfaction that the project brought.

The operation of the database produced politically-sensitive information about plot usage, some of which was used as an excuse to settle old scores. However the application never properly worked, it never replaced the old system, and it was never updated after initial implementation. Its impact on operational decisions was negligible.

Evaluation: Failure or Success?

The project failed to influence decision making as anticipated. Whilst Land Registry and Planning Department staff were keen, the political leadership was not happy with database results and found that the existing processing system was to its favour. The application can therefore be deemed a total failure. However, the installation introduced computer literacy into the Registry and, as an adjunct, greatly increased use of word processing. The external consultants found the technical side difficult, but rode a sharp learning curve and acquired a useful addition to their portfolio.

Enablers/Critical Success Factors

  1. Support from the controlling Department . Prior to the arrival of the project, the paper-based system worked to the benefit of an unholy alliance between the Head of the Land Registry and the political leadership in the local authority. These two were able to process licences in an arbitrary fashion, often receiving favours for their efforts. This was in contrast to the official procedures that envisage a purely administrative role for the Land Registry. The project was conceived by the Planning Department, which was the controlling department for the Registry, and relied on its support throughout. The Department was able to use the lure of modernity and technology to work up a head of steam in favour of the project amongst Land Registry staff and Beira Council's political leadership. Miffed at the arbitrary and non-technical nature of decisions, the Department thought that the application would restore its role as public interest guarantor of good planning practice.
  2. Enthusiasm of Land Registry staff . The evangelical enthusiasm shown by Land Registry staff, many of whom aligned themselves with the Planning Department's objectives, also contributed to the success of the installation and in particular the IT skills training.

Constraints/Challenges

  1. Apathy of, and resistance from, vested interests . As the installation progressed the Council's political leadership began to see the value of the information emerging. It was seen that licences were held for prime locations that should have been revoked long ago, and that some licence holders were continually reapplying to maintain control over land they could not yet develop because of lack of capital. Others with capital were simultaneously informed that no suitable plots existed. Further anomalies and irregularities also emerged. Yet behind each case lay a trail of influences and favours involving a spectrum ranging from key figures in the political leadership to low-level clerks. Automating basic decisions would compromise commitments they had made to applicants in breach of the regulations. Given low basic wages and high inflation the rewards from these commitments provided an important salary supplement that enabled many to make ends meet. Political leaders decided against change and the application - though installed - was never applied to decision making. It stood alone as a parallel information system, waning in relevance with every licence decision that was not registered within it.
  2. Operational shortcomings . The external consultants never quite managed to rid the application of its bugs and operational shortcomings. One big problem was the quality of data input. Operators had difficulty maintaining consistent spelling, spacing and casing of entries. For the cross-referencing to work the application required uniformity of data entry protocols. This constraint was a major blow to the application's defenders and proved fatal to its chances of being adopted.

Recommendations

  1. Match e-government applications incrementally to organisational realities . The critical failure factor was not so much the existence of private interest within the planning system but the belief that it could be cured by the technology alone. Had this organisational reality been incorporated into application and project design it could have been dealt with more subtly and effectively rather that being confronted head on. Maybe the application could have been introduced first in some of the newer urban development areas where plot licence decisions were more mundane and straightforward, and then gradually extended to other areas. This approach would have allowed the political leadership to gain credit from the application and bask in the reflected glory of a computerised Land Registry, rather than feel like Dr. Frankenstein threatened by the monster they had unwittingly created.
  2. Look for win-win situations . Introducing e-government through a win-win approach in which all stakeholders gain has far greater chances of success than trying to use e-government as a Trojan horse to smuggle in changes or to wage power struggles in proxy through the introduction of technology. The latter approach requires those introducing the technology to have the power to force change through, which in this case the Planning Department did not have.

Further Information

davidjackson@wiseowls.org

Case Details

Author Data Sources/Role : Direct Role.
Outcome : Total Failure. Reform : eAdministration (Managing Process Performance).
Sector : Social Services (Local Authorities).
Region : Southern Africa. Start Date : 1992. Submission Date : August 2002

Last updated on 19 October, 2008.
Please contact richard.heeks@manchester.ac.uk with comments and suggestions.